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Editor’s Note 
Dear reader, Analytica is happy to announce the eight volume of our E-Journal. Continuing with 
the good practice of targeting important and ongoing issues, the eight edition of ANALYTICAL 
is dedicated to the EU and its Neighbours.  
The past two decades have been years of political and economic turmoil for the neighbouring 
countries of the EU27, from its immediate neighbourhood in the Western Balkans to its partners 
in the Mediterranean union.  Faced with diverse challenges like: the EU integration processes, 
economic crisis, protests, the changes after “the Arab spring”, and sustainable development, the 
countries of the EU’s neighbourhood have different agendas when it comes to their relations with 
the Union. 
By the end of 2011, Egypt and Tunisia had their first elections after the fall of the old regimes. 
Gaddafi and his ruling finally ended in Libya and Syria is out-casted by its Arabic partners. The 
Western Balkans is facing a new threat in the renewal of violence in North Kosovo, as the EU is 
staring into the abyss with a very possible break-up of the Eurozone just around the corner. 
How all this has an impact on EU’s relations with its neighbours; how will the new EEAS cope 
with the demanding events that unfold; what will happen with the enlargement process in the 
following years; what are the challenges of the “Arab spring”   – are only few of the issues which 
concern the decision-makers in the EU and its neighbourhood. Drawing from the experience of 
different countries, the papers in this Journal’s edition try to present some new insights and give 
recommendations for the future of the relations between the EU and its neighbours - the Western 
Balkans, as well as in North Africa and the Middle East.  
As mentioned, in the newest issue of ANALYTICAL the authors try to give answers to some of 
the issues raised above. Their arguments range from the positive and negative sides of the 
Mediterranean Union, the possible future of that Union, the Western Balkans and its EU and 
non-EU future, and in particular the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, and where 
they stand in their relations with the EU and their neighbours as well.   
Frosina Ilievska focuses on examining the reasons for creation of the Mediterranean Union as 
well as its functions following with the issues that caused its deadlock as well as whether the 
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existence of the Mediterranean Union should be terminated or should the EU try to restart this 
project and support it with all its resources and institutions. From another angle, Ana Postolache 
focuses on the new challenges in the relations between the EU and the countries from the 
Mediterranean. She tried to assess the impact of the contemporary events on these relations and 
to draw an analysis on the historical course of relations between the European Union and the 
Mediterranean countries while highlighting the main initiatives and the consequences of the 
adopted practices on the region. Speaking of the Western Balkans, Geert Luteijn and 
Katharina Mathias discuss the future of the region within the new developments in the EU. 
They focused on the EU integration model that has been developed through several integration 
rounds for new member states and how that model through its lack of conflict-sensitivity, is 
poorly equipped to foster the integration of a post-conflict society. They took two case studies 
through which they made their argument: North Kosovo in Kosovo and Sandžak in Serbia which 
are regions that still suffer from high political and social tensions. Daniel Trenchov on the other 
hand explores and identifies the common interest for both the European Union and the Western 
Balkan countries from the integration of this region within the Union. He argues that on one 
hand the countries from this region see a clear benefit in the long run from having a strong 
multinational entity as an economic partner and on the other the EU by incorporating the 
Western Balkans within its frame will send an unambiguous signal that it plays the leading role 
in democratization of the societies by spreading common values based on diversity and not on 
glorification of one specific nation. Last three papers focus on two countries separately, the first 
one by Nikola Lazinica focuses on Bosnia and Herzegovina and its challenges to join the EU 
family which range from bridging the way from Dayton to Brussels to conducting the significant 
structural reforms that should be performed with larger involvement of domestic political factors 
than it has been done in the past. He analyzes the current state of affairs in BiH and considers 
possible steps that should be taken in the future towards EU accession. Marija Đorđeska 
focuses on Macedonia and its relations with the EU on one hand and Turkey on the other hand. 
She argues that the integration of Macedonia into the EU depends on a strong or weak Greece 
and that these developments could have influence on Macedonia which in the future could turn 
more to Turkey which also faces issues with its EU integration process. Last but not least, Dejan 
Marolov goes back in the past analyzing the EU policy towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and its success i.e. failure in terms of predefined and publicly promoted goals with a special 
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emphasis on the EU politics towards Macedonia during the Yugoslav crisis. His research 
attempts to present the rudiments of a separate Macedonian foreign policy and to give 
explanations of certain problems in the relationship between the then European Community and 
the newly formed state.  
 
We hope you find our selection of papers relevant and engaging. Enjoy reading this issue of 
Analytical and do not hesitate to share your thoughts, comments and suggestions with us at:  
journal@analyticaklmk.org.     
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The EU policy towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
Special emphasis on the EU policy towards the Republic of Macedonia 
By Dejan Marolov 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the EU policy towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia and its success i.e. 
failure in terms of predefined and publicly promoted goals. In this context, the EU politics 
towards Macedonia during the Yugoslav crisis are specifically analyzed. Positions of certain - 
EU member states, especially Britain, France and Germany are part of the analysis too. 
Inevitably this paper treats the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as one of the Union’s 
pillars introduced by the Maastricht Treaty from 1992. This survey uses relevant literature as 
well as analysis of certain acts. The research concludes that the EU politics of dealing with the 
situation in Yugoslavia was generally unsuccessful and EU policy towards Macedonia during the 
period of the Yugoslav crisis was quite controversial. Analyzing the degree of success / failure of 
EU policy towards dealing with the Yugoslav issue is significant in terms of analyzing the real 
capacity of the Union of this time period about realization of the promoted ambitions of 
becoming world's political player. The EU policy towards Macedonia in this time is very 
important and has its influence on the contemporary relations between Macedonia and EU. 
Through the representation of the Macedonia - EU relationship during the Yugoslav crisis, this 
research attempts to present the rudiments of a separate Macedonian foreign policy and to give 
explanations of certain problems in their relationships.  
 
Key words: Disintegration of Yugoslavia, EU policies, Macedonia, Greece.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper consists of two main and supplementary parts. The first one examines the politics of 
EU towards the disintegration of the former Yugoslav federation. The second one deals with the 
EU policy specifically towards Macedonia during the Yugoslav crisis. The way of setting up the 
skeleton of this paper is due to the cause - effect relationship of EU policy towards Yugoslavia 
and EU policy towards Macedonia. So mostly through the method of deduction the general 
policy of the EU towards Yugoslavia is analyzed in order to find appropriate EU policy towards 
Macedonia. The analysis of EU policy towards Yugoslavia provides possibilities for analysis of 
change of the balance and restructuring of power in Europe in the initial period after the Cold 
War. In this direction in the first part are processed the relevant policies of the three most 
powerful European countries UK, France and Germany. Their individual policies are processed 
in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CDSP) of EU and the implications 
on it. Furthermore, the paper elaborates the relation between the disintegration of Yugoslavia and 
the CFSP of the EU as response to the Yugoslav crisis. 
As part of the former Yugoslav federation, Republic of Macedonia was treated as part of an 
overall EU policy towards Yugoslavia, but of course with existence of specific elements and 
issues. Exactly this relationship is part of the analysis of the second part. Through this, the laying 
of the foundation stone of the Macedonian independent foreign policy will be also presented with 
the explanation of the roots of some modern issues in the relations between Macedonia and the 
EU. 
 
2. The EU policies towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
This section will present the role of EC171 and the way that the Union has chosen to deal with the 
biggest war since the World War II on the European continent.  
Most of the authors generally consider that the EU did not deal well with the Yugoslav crisis and 
that in most of the time just seemed like paralyzed and powerless observer. This section will be 
started with Pond172 according to whom the dissolution of the state was a tragedy for both, 
Yugoslavia itself and Europe. The previous sentence may sound a bit confusing and opens 
several dilemmas. It is clear that the way the disintegration of Yugoslavia happened was 
undoubtedly tragic for Yugoslavia, but why would this be also a tragedy for Europe? Have 
Europe done enough to prevent this tragedy and whether it was obliged to do anything at all? We 
                                                             
171 In that time still European Community.  
172 Elizabeth Pond, Endgame in the Balkans, regime change, European style. (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2006). 
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believe that the initial quoted sentence of this section is entirely correct. The dissolution of 
Yugoslavia was equally tragic for Europe (i.e. EU) as well as for Yugoslavia itself. Namely, after 
half a century repetition of the phrase “never again Auschwitz” new camps have emerged on the 
territory of Europe. The passivity of EU, but also of the entire international community in 
general, can be illustrated trough the example of Srebrenica. We can say that EU remained 
paralyzed and practically just watched as the Bosnian war took over 100,000 (including many 
civilian) victims and more than 1.8 million displaced. 
However, maybe someone will claim that this war was not a war of the EU, and accordingly the 
EU did not have to do anything about it. We do not agree with this assertion. EU had to do more, 
if not for a moral reasons, then because of the fact that the one of the EU three main pillars is the 
common foreign and security policy. This pillar policy had long-term goals for making EU a 
visible player in the international relations. However, the case of the breakup of Yugoslavia 
inevitably posed the dilemma whether it is possible for the Union to be a world player when it 
cannot deal with the problems in its own backyard?  
The breakup of Yugoslavia was a tragedy for Europe, which failed on the moral test in one hand, 
but on the other hand this was also a terrible start of the common foreign and security policy 
project. But, why was this the case? To answer this question we must go back in the early 1990s 
and analyze the reasons for such behavior of the EU. Simply put, Europe was busy with itself. In 
1991 its member states set ambitious goals for the future the then European Community. They 
began with the process of transformation in the European Union and also the process of creating 
a common European currency. But the member states were also busy with themselves. The 
German government acknowledged that the process of unification of both blocs of Germany will 
be a process that is terribly costly173. In 1993 the common European market finally entered into 
force, but the German economy was still week. On the other hand, France and Great Britain did 
not look too favorably of the German unification. Part of the French political elites were not 
happy that after a half-century Germany will again be a strong state with full sovereignty, and 
somehow did not like the fact that the days when France was the only continental power with its 
own sector in Berlin are definitely over. Certainly we should not forget the whole context of the 
Post-Cold War period, which brought completely new rules. For example, France and Britain 
entered the Post-Cold War period as nuclear powers. When the cold war was over their nuclear 
weapons became too expensive and politically not very useful. Furthermore the trend of budget 
cuts of their own armies and the redirection of this money into domestic projects have become 
generally accepted for all EU members. Therefore none of the EU countries like the idea for re-
allocated funds from the budgets for military purposes once the cold war was over.  
However these were not the only reasons. The existence of different national interests and 
visions for the future of Yugoslavia was another important reason. This situation is reflected in 
                                                             
173About 100 billion dollars yearly were being used for equalization between the West and East German economy.  
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the failure to build a common foreign and security policy towards the Yugoslav issue. If we 
consider the foreign policies of the three most powerful states in the EU, regarding the Yugoslav 
crisis, we can see the following. 
For the German foreign policy, we can say that it was supporting the creating of independent 
states of Slovenia and Croatia, and with this, the end of Yugoslavia or an end to the great Serbian 
projects, according to the German policy views. So the German foreign policy was quite active 
in the field of providing support for Croatia and Slovenia on the one hand and accusation for the 
outbreak of conflict to Serbia, on other. 
Unlike Germany, the UK in its policy towards the Yugoslav issue was not creating such black 
and white picture of what was happening there. Thus, unlike Germany, the UK was not so 
favored of the creation of independent states of Slovenia and Croatia, and did not see Serbia as 
the only initiator of the war. According to the UK policy, there cannot be only one responsible 
for the outbreak of the conflict, and in accordance with this view, all the sides were equally 
guilty. According to certain authors174 UK had developed tactic by which an action by the West 
is not necessary good because what was going on in Yugoslavia would inevitably result in a war 
between the Balkan “tribes” and finally with the creation of one hegemony (Serbian) which 
Britain would later easily handle …”To justify their inaction, statesmen and diplomats chose to 
interpret the war as a peculiarly Balkan phenomenon. It was allegedly the result of ancient and 
irrational animosities, inherent in Balkan peoples, who had seemingly been at each others’ 
throats since time immemorial and were all as bad as each other."175. It seems that the use of 
terminology like “Balkan tribes” had specific role in creating a kind of justification why UK 
should stay out of the Yugoslav war. Opposite of this it would be also both military and 
economically costly. 
The French foreign policy toward Yugoslavia was much closer to the UK policy rather than to 
the German. Thus, France in a way was still seeing Serbia as its ally from the Balkans and 
therefore opposed any position by which they were the only solely responsible side for the war. 
Similar to the UK, France too, chose to have a passive view by which the West should not 
interfere too much in Yugoslavia. This would have meant a swift victory of the Serbian forces to 
the rest of Yugoslavia. France did not look favorably toward the creation of an independent 
Croatia and Slovenia as well. This France - UK policy reflected in the Security Council where 
the only thing they were willing to do about Yugoslavia was the introduction of sanctions on 
imports of arms for entire Yugoslavia. By this, they have indirectly helped the Serbs and the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (YNA), which was mostly under Serbian control and which already 
owned the bulk of existing weapons. 
                                                             
174 Elizabeth Pond, Endgame in the Balkans, regime change, European style. (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2006). 
175 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslav bloody collapse. Causes, Course and Consequences (New York: University Press 
Washington Square, 1995), P 194. 
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Some of the reasons for these France-UK positions could be searched in some fears that may 
exist concerning the recent unification of Germany which once again, was becoming one of the 
most powerful European states. This was used from the Serbian propaganda according to which 
Germany was working on its fourth Reich that under its control would have the territory from the 
Baltic to the Adriatic. Such claims were exaggeration of reality, but definitely, Germany had a 
particular interest in recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence and by this an end to 
the existence of Yugoslavia. Certainly whether these fears were justified or not, rational or not, 
had some degree of truth in the formation of the foreign policy of UK and especially France 
which in the two world wars was the one of the first that felt the German militarism. 
The existence of such different approaches and policies by the three most powerful members of 
the EU could not result in a creation of a common policy of the EU towards the Yugoslav issue. 
However, despite the existence of different views, we can still speak about a common position of 
the EU towards Yugoslavia. EU had a common policy from the period before the referendum in 
Slovenia until the military intervention from YPA. In the period before the referendum in 
Slovenia, the policy of the EU was common in a way that ignored the possibility for potential 
problems, despite the existence of many indications for a possible disaster. However it must be 
emphasized that this applies only to the policy of the EU because if we claim the same for the 
individual European powers it would be naive. According to some definitions of foreign policy, 
even the decision not do to anything is still a foreign policy176. Accordingly we believe that 
ignoring the Yugoslav problem i.e. was actually a decision and a common position in the foreign 
policy of the EU. 
After the referendum for secession in Slovenia, the EU could no longer ignore the potential 
problem in Yugoslavia. From this point EU changed the direction of its foreign policy from 
inactive to active. EU based its policy on the territorial integrity principle versus the self-
determination principle. According to the principle of territorial integrity, EU initially identified 
Slovenia and Croatia as a threat to stability and peace in Southeast Europe and the federal 
government and the YNA as a stabilizing factor. “In the first such crisis in Europe after the end 
of the cold war, the EC countries quickly identified two new threats to European stability in 
Croatia and Slovenia, which they saw as responsible for destabilizing of the new international 
order in Europe. The communist Yugoslav government and its federal Army, in this view, stood 
for European stability. This preference for the status quo in the Balkans, even if it meant 
maintaining a communist government in power against widespread popular resistance, served as 
the basis for early Western policy towards the breakaway Republics."177. The reasons for this 
original and perhaps ironic attitude of EU towards the Yugoslav question can be sought in the 
fear for possible creation of a vacuum space in Europe. This means that there was a possibility to 
                                                             
176The foreign policy is a strategy of approach chosen by the national government to achieve its objectives in 
relations with external entities. This includes the decision not to do anything. By Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, 
Timothy Dunne (2008). 
177 Reneo Lukic and Allen Lznch, Europe from the balkans to the Urals,The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Page 253. 
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create a secessionist mess that could not be controlled. The possibility that what happens in 
Yugoslavia can also be copied in other places too and maybe even to encourage some of this 
secessionist movements within the EU countries themselves, was the basics fear. However in the 
same time the possibility for destabilization of Yugoslavia was also a possible refugee problem 
for the EU. Especially concerned with this was Italy, which shared part of its border with 
Yugoslavia. In France for example, beside the fear of the separatist movement in Corsica, we 
should not forget the imperial past of France and its resistance to the colonialism. In support to 
this is the statement by the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas “The recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia would mean throwing gasoline on the flames and tomorrow what we will do in 
Yugoslavia will be done for other cases too."178. So, these kinds of reasons were the basis for 
building a common foreign policy towards Yugoslavia based on the support of the principle of 
territorial integrity. This policy of the EU became crystal clear during the voting on 23 June 
1991, just two days before the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. At this 
meeting it was unanimously voted that the EU will not recognize the independence of Slovenia 
and Croatia if they do it unilaterally. Interesting is the fact that Germany too attached itself to 
this common policy position and despite the possible existence of its different views, did not dare 
to act unilaterally. Beside this verbal support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, Europe 
offered something else too, but did not achieve the desired effect because it came too late. “(…) 
at the end of May, an EC delegation to Belgrade headed by Commission President Jacques 
Delors promised Prime Minister Ante Markovic generous financial aid if the country remain 
together, though by this stage Markovic no longer had any influence."179. Specifically there have 
been 4 billion dollars of loan offered for stabilization of the Yugoslav economy with a 
precondition that Yugoslavia remains one country. Yet, apparently, this promise of generous 
financial aid came too late and had no real influence on the processes of disintegration of the 
country. As we know, this policy of the EU did not bear fruit and instead of achieving its goal, 
i.e. survival of the Yugoslav federation or some form of peaceful transformation into a 
confederation, the Yugoslav state completely disintegrated. 
Therefore, already in June Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. After the proclamation 
of independence YPA made a clumsy military action attacking Slovenia. The result was wining 
the sympathies of the western public for Slovenia that was opposing the powerful Yugoslav 
army. Due to the intervention of YPA in Slovenia the EU changed its policy in respect of the 
principle of territorial integrity.  
The YPA intervention referred to an official change in the German policy which replaced the 
support of the principle of territorial integrity (which was an official policy of the EU) with the 
open support for the principle of self-determination. At the meeting held on 15 September 
                                                             
178Alan Riding, “European Community freezes arms sales and aid,” New York times (1991) accessed January 15, 
2010. P 4. 
179 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslav bloody collapse. Causes, Course and Consequences (New York: University Press 
Washington Square, 1995). P 175. 
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1991in Venice, the foreign ministers of Italy and Germany, for the first time openly mentioned 
the possibility of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, despite the positions of the other EU 
members. Therefore the start of the military conflict in Slovenia was used by Germany to open 
up the agenda for the possibility for recognition of the secessionist republics. This was justified 
as the only and unique option in order to preclude the further spillover of the conflict. Those 
German positions have encouraged some other countries, outside the Union, which shared 
similar views, but were afraid publicly to say it, in order not to be charged as separatists. 
Primarily this was Austria180. In the context of its imperial past it must be mentioned that 
approximately half the territory of Yugoslavia was incorporated in it (i.e. the territories of 
Slovenia, Croatia and later B&H)181. Another one was Hungary from which the Croatian 
government secretly purchased weapons for the independence war. 
The YPA action was a crucial moment that was the turning point that made the EU common 
policy toward Yugoslavia nonexistent. The EU found itself divided between the German and the 
UK-France positions. For this issue France even replaced its traditional EC partner - Germany 
with the UK. This strong Franco-British couple tried to shape the EU common policy and this 
was also supported by several EU member states especially Greece, Spain and the Netherlands, 
while Germany was alone inside the EU defending the self-determination issue. However, 
Ireland and Denmark had some sympathy to the right for self-determination. With this 
combination of the power within the EU, we can conclude that the Franco-British couple in a 
significant extent shaped the overall EU policy towards Yugoslavia. Confirmation of the above is 
found in the literature that deals with the common foreign and security policy. According to 
Lukic& Lynch(1996, p.259)182 “in sum, France and the UK have been rather successful in 
shaping the foreign policy of the EC as a whole. Thus the aggregate supranational interest of the 
EC in the Yugoslav conflict in fact closely reflected the national interests of France and the UK." 
If we just look at the EU diplomats involved directly in the process of the Yugoslavia issue, we 
will notice that the diplomats were hidden supporters of the national interests of Britain and 
France. One such example is Lord Carrington. While the German foreign policy blamed the 
Serbs for the war, the British and French foreign policy saw all sides as equally guilty. Therefore 
Lord Carrington (Carrington 1995) was against what he called black and white picture and 
considered that the Serbs have a case in point too. The very statement is in the context of the UK 
and France positions. 
With the existence of such divisions within the EU, it became virtually impossible for the EU to 
undertake any serious actions about the situation in Yugoslavia. However, one thing was 
commonly accepted by all sides (inside EU and even from USA), and that was the definition of 
the Yugoslav problem as a European problem. For this attitude largely contributed the pressure 
                                                             
180 Austria joined the EU in 1995.  
181 The Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918.  
182 Reneo Lukic and Allen Lznch, Europe from the balkans to the Urals,The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).  
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created in the media but also by the USA which refused to engage into the direct resolution of 
the Yugoslavian issue in its early stages. In a situation in which we have de facto military 
conflict on the Yugoslav territory, particularly in Slovenia, with realistic chances to expand, the 
EU sends a mission in Yugoslavia.“After talks with the federal and republic’s leadership, the EC 
delegation obtained a cease-fire on 28 June 1991, ending troop movement by all sides. The EC 
delegation pressured Croatia and Slovenia to suspend their declarations of independence for 
three months. The EC delegation also extracted an agreement from Milosevic to withdraw his 
veto of the Croatian leader Stipe Mesic as the new (and duly scheduled) chairman of 
Yugoslavia’s collective Presidency”183.  
Let us analyze what were the main objectives of the EU with this mission. The first objective 
was obviously an immediate ceasefire and the second goal was an attempt to preserve the 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia through the resurrection of the Yugoslav federal presidency as 
one of the most important federal institutions. The meeting was held in Croatia, where the Croats 
and the Slovenes accepted to put their declarations of independence on hold three months and the 
federal Army accepted the three months cease-fire in Slovenia. The three-month cease-fire plan 
according to the EU was enough time for the peaceful discussions without violence to take place. 
After this, Jacques Poos, the foreign Minister of Luxembourg (“The Death of Yugoslavia” 1995) 
declared that the main goal of the mission has been achieved – immediate ceasefire and stopping 
of the further escalations. 
The facts given in the literature are divided over whether this mission was a success or not. We 
are more sympathetic to the second view and justify it with the fact that the long-term EU goal 
i.e. stopping the further escalation of the situation has not been accomplished. This is so because 
the fires very soon expanded in to the territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). 
So the statements of certain politicians, declaring great success of EU, were simply premature. 
Still, it is not denied that by cooperating with the EU, Slovenia became an independent state. At 
the same time, this success is not glorified, taking into account the fact that Slovenia was not in 
the sphere of interest of Serbia and it was relatively easily allowed to leave Yugoslavia. 
After the expiration of two months from the Jacques Poos statement in which he declared 
success of the EU mission, the war started to move in Croatia and the tensions in B&H were 
growing. In response to the Yugoslav tinderbox, EU organized a conference under the bat of 
Lord Carrington184. It is significant that this Hague Peace Conference had approach to 
Yugoslavia as a whole instead of dealing with the crisis areas happening on the ground. At the 
conference there were representatives of all Yugoslav nations and nationalities, including 
Albanians of Kosovo and Vojvodina’s Hungarians. This conference represented a new stage in 
the EU approach to the Yugoslav question. Until this moment the EU enforced ad hoc tactics for 
solving current problems as the conflict in Slovenia. However, from this moment its strategy 
                                                             
183 Reneo Lukic and Allen Lznch, Europe from the balkans to the Urals,The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). P 256. 
184Former general NATO secretary and former British foreign secretary. 
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changed and put all Yugoslav problems on the table for discussion. This approach was 
considered as more appropriate because the instability and the tensions were overlooked all over 
Yugoslavia and partial solving was unable to extinguish the whole fire. Still this concept had a 
too ambitious goal. The decision suggested was peaceful transformation of the Yugoslav 
federation in some sort of loose confederation consisting of autonomic republics and a peaceful 
transformation of the previous republic borders into inter-state borders. This solution was 
accepted by all the republics except Serbia. 
Soon it became perfectly clear that without a solid military support this kind of peace conference 
cannot be considered for anything more than a round table. The EU attempts to conclude new 
ceasefire were not respected on the ground. Furthermore this led to the question about the actual 
capabilities and instruments of the EU. If the military capabilities of member states were 
considered then the following conclusion could be drown. EU had no defense and military 
organization counterpart of the NATO pact185. Although there were certain attempts for the 
creation of a common EU defense army, all these projects failed as too ambitious. The only 
common defense alliance that EU countries have been in and are in is NATO. But in NATO the 
main player was AND IS the USA, which apparently had no intention to intervene in the 
Yugoslav war at this early stage. On the other side, the EU itself, with the exception of France 
and Britain, had no military basis for such a major operation as the intervention in the Yugoslav 
wars. It should be mentioned that Germany had the necessary capacity but this was not possible 
in accordance with its post World War II Constitution. So we can conclude that the situation with 
the military capacity of the EU-NATO looked like this - there was no will for NATO to 
intervene. The two EU countries that had  military and financial capacity for intervention (France 
and UK) refused to do it, while Germany, which possessed the capacity to intervene could not do 
it and all the other EU members simply did not have the capacity to do so. 
If the EU was unwilling or unable to use military methods, then which were the available 
instruments of the EU? As we already mentioned, there was an offer for financial help to 
Yugoslavia if the country stayed together. The use of the instruments of economic character is 
not something that is unseen in the EU tactics and is part of the so-called policy of ‘stick and 
carrot’. In this concrete situation it would have meant that if Yugoslavia remained together or 
peacefully transformed into a loose federation, than it would get the “carrot" – great financial 
assistance. On the other hand, the stick was – not signing any new trade agreements, suspension 
of existing treaties agreements, introduction of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia etc. The 
use of the financial instrument as a tool for persuasion seemed very logical, especially due to the 
fact that the European Communities were the largest trading partner of Yugoslavia. That is why 
this approach should have been used much earlier. Unfortunately at the moment when the EU 
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began to use this instrument it was unable to produce any important effects, because in those 
moments the nationalism in Yugoslavia was already irreversibly inflamed. 
It seems that in those moments much more effective EU instrument had political rather than 
economic character. The political power of the EU arose mainly from the power of its members 
to recognize or not the new states. Recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia on 
the one hand or their non-recognition on the other hand, was the instrument that the EU had in 
conducting various negotiations with them. The same instrument was applied for the Serbs too, 
thus the recognition or not of the parts that are seceding from Yugoslavia was used as a means to 
made the Serbs negotiate. Overall, the policy of the EU was not much more successful in terms 
of dealing with the war in B&H, although at the moment, EU already had Slovenia and Croatia 
as an experience. When it became obvious that the tensions in B&H can escalate into a real war, 
EU organized and mediated a meeting186 between Radovan Karadzic, Mate Boban and Alija 
Izetbegovic – the leaders and representatives of the three communities in B&H. The EU 
mediator presented his plan for reconstruction of B&H into a three regions with great autonomy. 
According to the plan each region would have a majority of one of the existing three nations in 
the Republic. All regions would have had an equal role in the central government in Sarajevo. 
Regarding the external borders it was stressed that they will remain the same, which practically 
meant that secession and annexation of parts of B&H towards the neighboring countries would 
not be possible. However, the B&H design presented at the Lisbon meeting was not supported by 
the Bosniak side, along with the United States, which considered that this agreement opens the 
door to divide the country. After the collapse of this meeting, the violence irreversibly started in 
B&H, after which EU withdrew its observers from the ground. This initial failure is also repeated 
in the next steps that will be undertaken by EU in order to resolve the Bosnian issue. 
In August 1992 the EU together with the United Nations organized the London conference with 
a working agenda dedicated to Yugoslavia. During this conference, some basic positions for the 
solution of the Bosnian war have been set up. It was said that any solution for B&H must respect 
its external borders, non-recognition of the territory acquired by the use of force etc. These 
positions were the basis for the work of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia held 
in Geneva in September 1992. Namely, on this conference the first version of the Vans-Oven 
plan was drafted. This plan suggested creation of 10 provinces in B&H, which although they 
would have been ethnically heterogeneous, they would also have a clear majority from one of the 
three communities living in B&H. For Sarajevo was suggested to be a separate province and 
Capital which would also reflect the multiethnic character of B&H. Official proponents of the 
plan were the EU and UN. This plan was signed in May 1993 by all warring sides. What initially 
seemed like a great success and possibility for peace in B&H very soon turned out into complete 
failure. Thus, although the plan was originally signed by the Bosnian Serbs, it still was not 
ratified in the Parliament of the self-declared Serbian Republic of B&H. This event represented a 
key challenge for the EU. The Union was in a position to demonstrate whether it has a credibility 
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to implement what it had proposed and was accepted by all parties. Eventually the Parliament of 
the Republic of Srpska did not give its ratification to the peace plan. After this event the EU was 
unable to implement the plan and with this in a way recognized the self-proclaimed Republic of 
Srpska acknowledging the decision of its institutions.  
In terms of the conflicting interests within the Union, i.e. the France-British couple on one hand 
and Germany on the other hand, it could be concluded as a sort of victory for Germany. This is 
confirmed by the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the members of the Union. Simply, the 
preferences of Franco-British couple were not assessed high enough for them to openly confront 
its powerful German partner. The Yugoslav crisis was very important for Europe because it 
actually meant a change in the balance of power in Europe. After the Yugoslav crisis, France and 
the UK had to recognize that the re-united Germany is once again a powerful factor in Europe 
whose voice cannot be ignored. 
3. The policy of EU towards Macedonia during the Yugoslav crisis 
In order to present the politics and relations of the EU towards Macedonia, firstly we must look 
at the behavior of Macedonia during the Yugoslav crisis. Looking back Macedonia was not one 
of the leader republics of the dissolution process of Yugoslavia. Rather, it could be concluded 
that largely it was exactly the opposite. Some Macedonian politicians even made efforts together 
with politicians from the other republics to find a mutually acceptable solution and to rescue the 
common state. Such example was the Izetbegovic – Gligorov platform187 which was not accepted 
by the other republics. So, in a situation where Macedonia could not have been qualified as 
“secessionist" republic, it could not have been subjected of significant diplomatic activities by 
the EU. This was the case because just before the declaration of independence by both northern 
Yugoslav republics, the Union had built a common position which consisted of condemnation 
and disapproval of any kind of unilateral declaration of independence of any republic188, but also 
condemnation and disapproval of eventual use of force to retain the wholeness of Yugoslavia189. 
Simply, the general position of the EU was to support the survival of Yugoslavia. Logically, 
subject of diplomatic action by the EU were the republics that opted for dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. In accordance with the general tendency of Macedonia to help the federation 
survive, the main activity of the EU in this initial period, was not directed towards Macedonia, 
but primarily towards the pro-dissolution of Slovenia and Croatia on one hand and towards the 
federal and pro-centralistic positioned Belgrade and the YNA which threatened to use force to 
preserve the federation on the other hand. 
Where was the Republic of Macedonia in all this? Before the Conference for the Former 
Yugoslavia in The Hague, Macedonia already applied to the Union as a separate country (though 
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still part of the Federation) with a memorandum entitled “The international position of 
Macedonia and its status in the Yugoslav community." In this memorandum Macedonia 
expressed its views and stood for survival of Yugoslavia as a union of sovereign states with some 
federal elements. The memorandum also mentioned the “European processes”; “The 
disintegration of the economic and the political system of Yugoslavia in the shape that has 
existed up till now, faces with the necessity of fundamental reconstruction of the state. This 
process of reorganizing of relations among the Yugoslav republics should correspond with the 
European processes. This means respect for the independent and sovereign position of each state 
as a precondition for higher forms of integration.”190 If analyzing the positions of Macedonia 
expressed in the Memorandum, it will be noticed that they are practically the same solutions that 
later the EU offered at the Hague Conference. The Memorandum itself is very significant for 
Macedonia, because the Republic referred directly to the EU as a separate country not as a part 
of the federation; consequently it imposed itself as participant and as a stricken party that cannot 
be ignored in future decisions and projections about Yugoslavia. 
After the outbreak of the military conflict in Croatia EU understood that the problem has not 
been solved at all and appointed a mediator to work on solving the Yugoslav problem. This is 
due to at least two facts. First, USA gave the “main player” role to the EU and second the EU 
was not the same any more after Maastricht. One of the main changes made with this treaty was 
the introduction of the Unions pillar system. According to this, one of the three pillars was the 
European Common Foreign and Security policy - CFSP191. Unlike the first pillar192, in the 
second (CFSP) pillar and in the third pillar193 the principle of Supranationalism was replaced 
with the principle of Inter-governmentalism. The reason for this is the fact that the issues treated 
outside the first pillar, were much more sensitive for the member states in a terms of their 
sovereignty. 194  
First special appointed mediator was Lord Carrington and later Lord Owen. During its dealing 
with the Yugoslav problem EU organized series of conferences in The Hague195 and together 
with the UN was the organizer of the London Conference196 and the Geneva Conference197. “The 
EC peace Conference was, in theory, exactly what Yugoslavia needed, since it aimed to consider 
the country as a whole and to develop a coordinated approach to all the region’s conflicts rather 
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than merely deal with immediate flash-points, such as that in Croatia, in isolation. (…) while the 
conditions in Bosnia - Herzegovina and Macedonia was supposed to be as much part of the 
agenda as those in Slovenia and Croatia."198. The goal of this peace conference was to find a 
solution for the ongoing war in Croatia and a comprehensive solution for other conflicts in 
Yugoslavia. All the Yugoslav republics were represented. Thanks to this new EU approach, 
Macedonia officially became part of the common policy of the EU agenda and the situation in 
Macedonia rose to the level of equal importance with the situation in Croatia, which was at war 
at that time.  
Why was this so important for the Republic of Macedonia? The answer is, because through The 
Hague Conference, for the first time in history Macedonia took part at an international 
conference presented by its own representatives and became an equal participant. This 
international conference discussed, among other current issues, the future of Macedonia. This is 
certainly the beginning of an independent Macedonian foreign policy. The Macedonian 
representatives at this conference were Kiro Gligorov, Denko Malevski as Minister of Foreign 
Relations, and Vasil Tupurkovski as member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia199. They were 
sitting side by side with their colleagues from Serbia- Milosevic, Croatia –Tudjman, B&H - 
Izetbegovic, Slovenia – Kucan, Montenegro- Bulatovic. The Macedonian representative Kiro 
Gligorov had a speech at the Conference and presented his views according to which, Macedonia 
believed that despite all the difficulties the existence of Yugoslavia was still possible in a new 
form but on the principle of affirmation of the sovereignty of the republics. Furthermore, the 
concerns of the international community and especially the EU were legitimate and justified; 
there was need for cessation of all military actions as precondition for negotiations; the republics 
needed mutual recognitions as a basis for equality in the future status of the Yugoslav 
community and last but not least, Macedonia was committed to good neighbourly relations and 
had willingness to play a role of an active factor of peace and stability in the Balkans. 
However, if a real critical review of The Hague Conference is done, it could be find out that 
although originally it had a working agenda that treats Yugoslavia as a whole and all the 
problems in the republics as equal, in reality it appeared to be mediating in finding a solution 
between the big republics, Serbia and Croatia. This can be also confirmed with the following 
interview given by Lord Carrington “We decided to see people who actually mean something, the 
Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman and we set them on the table and began to talk to them."200. It 
can be concluded that this picture has been repeated more or less on all future conferences 
organized by the EU and with the time, the primacy of the agenda was mainly concentrated on 
B&H, as well as on the main actors, Croatia and Serbia, while all the other republics were more 
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or less, only formally part of the agenda. Just for illustration on the London Conference201 
although there were Macedonian representatives the Macedonian question was not treated at 
all.”Before we began with the regular work with determination of the agenda, I asked the 
Conference to consider the issue of the Macedonian recognition. But unfortunately the issue did 
not come into agenda.”202  
The Hague Conference is important for Macedonia namely because of the decision to organize 
this kind of peace conference on a meeting held on 27 August 1991 on which it was decided to 
establish the Arbitration Committee. The Committee has been established to help by providing 
legal opinions to the work of The Hague Peace Conference. Thus, these opinions would have 
strong influence on the policy of the Union towards Yugoslavia, i.e. Macedonia respectively. 
The head of the Commission was Robert Badinter, a famous lawyer and Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court of France. The Commission was composed by legal experts. Its members 
were the presidents of constitutional courts in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain203. Regarding 
the opinions of the Commission, there were some discussions in terms of their weight. Although 
foreign ministers of the EU initially agreed that they should be legally binding, normally for the 
parties that would accept its jurisdiction, later they were only treated as advisory. The reasons for 
this reduction of the importance of the Commission positions are given by the authors 
Lukic&Lynch (1996)204 according to whom, this was done in order not to allow legal opinions in 
advance to prevent any political agreements. This implicated that virtually anything can be 
negotiated. In this particular case we can say that the law was subordinate to the politics. 
However, the Badinter Commission was composed of leading experts in law who came from 
different EU countries in order to be neutral and to build their views based on purely legal and 
not political grounds.  
The commission was summoned to give its opinion about the legal consequences of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia on 15 specific questions. We will make a brief analysis of some of 
these opinions that we think were relevant for the creation of the EU policy towards Macedonia. 
The first question on which the Badinter Commission gave its opinion was asked personally by 
the Lord Carrington and was a question with paramount importance about whether Yugoslavia 
should disintegrate. Serbia and Montenegro believed that all those republics that have decided to 
become independent (including Macedonia) should be considered as secessionist ones and that 
SFRJ should continue to exist with the republics that would decide to stay (at least Serbia and 
Montenegro). On the other hand, all the other republics (including Macedonia) and above all 
Slovenia and Croatia, thought that this is not a secession process but a disintegration process in 
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accordance with the will of the founding republics and therefore all these six republics are equal 
successors to the former federation in a way that none of them alone can claim to be sole heir of 
the former federation. The opinions of the Commission took the position of the second view and 
concluded that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution. On 4 July 1992 the Commission 
concluded that the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia had been finished and that SFRJ no 
longer existed. Also according to the legal interpretation of the Badinter Commission all former 
republics are legal successors of the former Yugoslavia. The outcome of this opinion was 
favorable for Macedonia as well. According to the opinion all the republics that declared 
independence, cannot be considered as secession states created by cutting a territory from a 
previous state, but as successor states of former Yugoslavia with all rights and obligations arising 
from it.  
Besides the first one, particularly interesting is also the second opinion, although it does not have 
direct importance for Macedonia. It was a question asked by Serbia regarding the rights of the 
Serbian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as constituent nations of Yugoslavia, 
specifically in relation to the right of self-determination. The opinion of the Commission 
practically consisted of two important elements. The first one was that the Serbs in Croatia and 
B&H are entitled to have political and cultural autonomy within Croatia and B&H, and the 
second one was that they do not have the right to establish a new state or join other countries on 
their own will. 
The third opinion was given as a response to a question asked again by Serbia. The question 
demanded clarification and interpretation of the dispute between the republics about the former 
internal - administrative borders between the republics, specifically between Croatia and Serbia, 
B&H and Serbia i.e. whether they are borders in terms of international law or not. The opinion of 
the Commission was to confirm or deny the Serbian-Montenegrin claim that these former 
Republic borders had a purely administrative character and accordingly they cannot 
automatically become international and interstate borders. Although this question does not 
directly mention Republic of Macedonia, it was still of great interest for the country. The legal 
basis that can be used as an argument for the former administrative republic borders between 
Serbia and Macedonia depended directly on the legal interpretation about the former internal 
republican borders by the Commission. The response of the Commission may be interpreted as 
positive for Croatia, B&H and Macedonia. Especially important for Macedonia was the 
interpretation of the Commission that205 the borders between Croatia and Serbia, B&H and 
Serbia and between other possible adjacent independent states may not be altered except by 
agreement between them and that according to established principles of international law 
amending the external borders by force cannot produce any legal effects. This was positive for 
Macedonia because it emphasized the principle that no one is allowed to use force to alter 
borders and even if this happens it cannot be legally recognized. 
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Particularly interesting for comparison is the opinion No.5 given by the Commission regarding 
the request for recognition of the independence of Croatia by the EU. The Commission206 
reserved the current recognition of Croatia’s independence, believing that Croatia must first 
improve the minority rights through legal amendment of its own legislation. 
The most important opinion of the Badinter Commission which directly concerns Macedonia 
was the opinion No. 6, in which the application for recognition of Macedonia has been reviewed 
to find out whether the country fulfils the conditions set by the EU in order to become a 
recognized independent republic. Interesting to note is that besides examining the necessary 
conditions for recognition, which were also valid for the other republics, in the case of 
Macedonia another supplementary question has been considered too. The Commission also 
examined the Greek government statement according to which the use of the name “Macedonia" 
as a name for the country, would mean irredentism towards Greece. According to the opinion of 
the Commission, there was no obstacle to the recognition of Macedonia's independence, i.e. 
Macedonia fulfilled all necessary conditions for this. Actually, the Commission implicitly 
rejected the Greek government claims that using the word “Macedonia" implied irredentism to 
Greece.  
The commission was created with the task to provide legal opinions on the Hague Peace 
Conference organized by the EU. So, any Commission opinion had a great legal weight and 
logically it should be taken into consideration during the building of common foreign policy of 
the EU. However, if we make a comparison between the content of the legal opinions No.5 and 
No.6 and their real effect through the conduct of the Union, we can conclude that the EU acted 
quite contrary to what was the opinion of the committee that itself created. Why is this 
comparison needed? Because through this comparison it can be seen the approach of the EU 
towards the Yugoslav issue and accordingly we can infer the policy of the EU towards 
Macedonia. The previous conclusion reveals one thing. The approach of the EU was primarily a 
political and the international law was on second place. Thus, because of the individual interests 
of the member countries (mainly Germany) Croatia was given the recognition (for which the 
Commission207 had expressed reserves in terms of meeting the requirements for its recognition) 
and at the same time the recognition of the independence of Macedonia was postponed (although 
the Commission208 confirmed adamantly that Macedonia fulfilled all conditions set by the EU for 
its recognition) because of the opposition by the Greek government (whose arguments the 
Commission had already declared as not relevant). The reason for this political decision by the 
EU consisted of various interests of its different member states. While the republics of Slovenia 
and Croatia had their own strong supporter in the EU member states expressed primarily in the 
face of powerful Germany, the Republic of Macedonia not only that did not have a strong 
supporter within the Union, but it had quite the opposite of that in the face of its first neighbor 
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country Greece, both EU and NATO member. According to Lukic & Lynch209 the German 
government decided to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia on 19 December 
1991. However because of consideration for the sensibility of its partners, the recognition was 
not implemented until 15 January 1992, date when 12 member states of the EU agreed with it. 
The previous reveals Germany's position as a strong supporter of Slovenia and Croatia, which 
not only lobbies but also puts pressure on the other members to recognize their independence. 
Lobbying by a powerful state as Germany certainly gave results. In contrast, Macedonia 
remained unrecognized for a longer period, despite the positive opinion given by the 
Commission, i.e. by Europe’s top legal experts. The harsh reality Macedonia felt already on the 
EU summit held on 15 January 1992, when the member states of the Union decided to recognize 
the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, but not the independence of Macedonia. 
In terms of policy of the EU towards Macedonia we can notice one other matter; EU did not treat 
the name issue as a real issue and as a potential significant problem. At the same time, the denial 
of the name by neighboring Greece turned into one of the top priorities in its foreign policy and 
Greece used all the possible mechanisms in all international organizations whose member it is 
(including EU) to resolve this issue according to its own national interest. Thus, immediately 
after the positive opinion about the recognition of the independence of Macedonia given by the 
Badinter Commission, on the very next EU summit210 the name issue was for the first time 
officially raised by Greece “Immediately after EC meeting recognizing the independence of 
Slovenia and Croatia, G. de Mikelis, on 15 January, stated at a press conference in Rome that 
the matter (the recognition of Macedonia) was only postponed for a short time to clarify some 
Greek reservations, but that it would need no more than a few weeks to find a solution. The issue 
of the name for him was not a real issue, nor had the EU made it a precondition for 
recognition.”211. According to Mirchev, minimizing the significance of the name issue was an 
integral part of the original policy of the Union towards Macedonia. At the EU summit held in 
Lisbon on 27 June 1992 there was a full victory of the Greek diplomacy as the EU concluded 
that they would recognize the Republic of Macedonia as an independent state only if it rejects the 
word “Macedonia” from its name. In this way the problem, which according to the original 
terminology used by EU officials was neither a problem nor a precondition for recognition of the 
republic, now officially became both.  
With the action of the EU towards Yugoslavia, i.e. Macedonia, a certain contradiction can be 
noticed between  the desired objectives of the Union and the acts it made in reality. Macedonia 
stepped out of Yugoslavia in a fully legitimate and peaceful way through the use of exclusively 
democratic means, not by going into any military conflict with the YNA. It signed an agreement 
with YNA for YNA’s peaceful departure from the country. With all these facts we can conclude 
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that Macedonia was the only republic which left the federation in a peaceful and democratic way. 
According to Mahncke, Ambos & Reynolds212 Macedonia was the only country which was not 
directly involved in the crises and wars in the 90’s. For a long time, Macedonia has been 
recognized as a kind of oasis of peace in the region. 
Because of this, the attitude of the EU towards Macedonia can be characterized as surprising. 
Namely, one of the Union’s main objectives concerning the Yugoslav issue was to prevent 
further spread of the fire. According to that, the Union decided to recognize Slovenia, Croatia 
and B&H, in order to prevent the aggressive ambitions of Serbia. So, in accordance with the 
objectives of the EU and in accordance with the positive opinion of the Commission established 
by the EU, the Union was expected to support this peaceful approach of Macedonia. By delaying 
the recognition, EU practically created an unrecognized territory, a part of the former federation 
that did not even have an army.213 “The name dispute, because of which the EC member Greece 
blocs the recognition of a small country by the Community, out of a Balkan mini comedy will 
actually become a national populist drama.” This could easily be interpreted by the neighbors of 
Macedonia as a message of the great powers that the territory of Macedonia can be recomposed. 
“In February 1992, the Greek prime minister called for meeting of all leaders of Greece, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia (which at that time still belonged to former Yugoslavia and was 
not a sovereign state). Bulgaria did not agree on holding this ‘mini-Balkans-Summit’, and other 
international powers intervened, so the meeting was canceled.”214. The question here is, why the 
EU (with its policy) allowed anybody to interpret in this way its policy and why EU allowed 
somebody to heat the passions for a possible new military conflict, this time on the territory of 
Macedonia, which could easily include countries outside of the former Yugoslav federation. One 
explanation is offered by Mirchev “In practice, it showed that the international community, in 
spite of its understanding and positive attitude, does not dispose of any mechanisms in order to 
positively work out this question for Macedonia.” He continues: “In this sense, the example of 
Macedonia is a small part of the mosaic of new and controversial realities in the world and 
European order." We agree with this position which suggests that it is more likely that there was 
a lack of appropriate mechanisms in the Post-Cold War Europe, through which EU would have 
achieved its own goals, rather than the Union deliberately would practice such a dubious policy.  
Because of the Greek reserves, shown in relation with the right of one of the successor republics 
from former Yugoslavia to continue to use the name Macedonia, now as an independent state, 
the process of recognition of the country was postponed and additionally complicated. According 
to Mahncke, Ambos & Reynolds (2004) the national interest meant a lot more than a coherent 
European action, as in the case of the rapid German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia 1991 
despite the disagreements with partners from the EU. One of the reasons was the unanimity rule 
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in the decision making process within the EU. According to this system, each member state has 
the right to veto any important decision concerning the EU’s foreign policy.  However this was 
not the only reason. Another example was the Greek economic embargo215, when Greece 
unilaterally closed the border with Macedonia. The Greek border was in the same time the EU 
border, so the Greek trade embargo to Macedonia meant also that the EU has a trade embargo to 
Macedonia. The Commission reacted and asked the European Court of Justice to bring the case 
of the possible violation of the Maastricht treaty216. However just before the Court gave its 
verdict, the Commission suddenly withdrew the lawsuit. This example clearly shows that the 
problem was not only in the CFSP limitations mostly because of the unanimity rule. Namely, the 
example above was legally part of the first pillar in which the supranational decision making 
prevails. Therefore what can be suggested is that the principle of solidarity between member 
states was implemented in this case (through the EU institutions). This kind of situation had 
influence on CFSP in general and on Macedonia as well. 
Interesting question here is why the other powerful EU members such as France were so 
indifferent to this pertinent issue? Simply, France did not have enough interest to confront with 
its ally - Greece (in the case of Macedonia) and even less to confront with Germany (case 
Croatia).. Only for illustration we give the following quote “(…) the French government did not 
give way to pressure over the recognition of Macedonia, despite the strong attention of the media 
on this issue."217. Despite the existence of the relatively pro-Macedonian mood in the French 
public, the government decided not to confront with Greece for the simple reason of not having 
interest to do it. 
Although Greece successfully managed to channelize its positions in the official positions of the 
Union, within the EU there were other opinions as well. According to Gallagher218 the internal 
tensions within the Union were publicly shown on 20 January 1993 by the Danish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen which has attracted the attention of Greek members of the 
European Parliament when he characterized the Greek position as “ridiculous” and expressed 
hope that the Security Council would very soon recognize Macedonia and that many of the 
Member States of the Communities would support this. Nevertheless, they was a strong support 
for the young independent republic and a stimulus for the country to continue fighting for the 
establishment of better relations with the EU. 
Some authors219 consider that the EU was quite active in acting preventively in Macedonia since 
the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis. Regarding the role of the EU, they note two important 
actions: firstly the establishment of the monitoring mission in 1991 with the task to report on the 
                                                             
215 In February 1994. 
216Article 225 – taking unilateral measures against the Community law. 
217 Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. A political failure of a scholarly explanation (Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000). 
218 Tom Gallagher, The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy (London: Routledge, 2003). 
219 Dieter Mahncke, Alicia Ambos and Christopher Reynolds, European foreign policy: from rhetoric to reality?. 
(Brussels: Presses Inter universitaires Europeennes, 2004). 
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political and economic progress, secondly, the establishment of the Badinter Commission 
established as a legal advisory by the EU. Due to these two elements, they argue that the Union 
was quite active and acted preventively in Macedonia.  We do not fully agree with this claim. 
Especially because the authors emphasize the importance of the Badinter commission but in the 
same time ignore its results. However in the later years the EU dedicated to put much more 
attention on Macedonia and was one of the main factors for the stability in the country especially 
during the conflict in 2001. Macedonia was the first country from the WB that has signed the 
Association and Stabilizations Agreement220. Macedonia was the place where the EU sent its 
first policy mission221. Macedonia has obtained official status of EU candidate country222 and the 
Commission is constantly giving its opinions about the Macedonian progress in the fulfilling of 
the Copenhagen criteria. Apart of the good mutually relations between Macedonia and the EU 
the same problems still prevail even today 20 years after the dissolution of the old country. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia took place in the period after the end of the Cold War. That was 
a period of pre-adaptation and redefining of the priorities of the foreign policies of the European 
countries. EU itself was in a similar process. In this context, EU launched ambitious projects like 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was supposed to promote, at this time still, the 
Economic Union as an international global player. However the way of the EU for dealing with 
the crisis, which was in its own backyard –Yugoslavia was unsuccessful start for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. In reality priority was given to the individual national policies of 
the member-states vs. the common EU foreign policy’s interests. After the Yugoslav crisis 
Germany came back to the most powerful European family together with France and the UK. On 
the other hand these developments had their impact on Macedonia as a former member of the 
Yugoslav Federation. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was a basis for foundation of the 
Macedonian independent state, and accordingly for the formation of the country’s foreign policy. 
The first step was made through the transmitted Memorandum by Macedonia directly (not 
through the Federation) to the EU and by sending its own representatives to the Hague 
Conference. In this way for the first time in Macedonian history, the Macedonians had their own 
representatives at an international conference, where it was discussed about the future of the 
country. However, the relations between Macedonia and the EU despite the expectations did not 
go smoothly. Namely, although Macedonia “played” according to European rules, it still 
remained unrecognized by the EU member states. Moreover the country had direct opposition for 
its recognition in the face of its southern neighbor and member of the EU – Greece. These 
factors, combined with the still incoherent international and European conditions and 
                                                             
220 April 2001 
221 EUFOR Concordia, March 2003- December 2003. 
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mechanisms of this period contributed to complications in the relations between the EU and 
Macedonia in a way that is creating problems in their contemporary relations as well.  
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